While armed clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and an alliance of tribal groups continues across rural Deir Ezzor, the conflict may be reaching a pivotal junction as the SDF has withdrawn from a string of villages along the southern Euphrates River. Arab tribal leaders, meanwhile, are increasingly uniting around a set of political demands that would amount to sweeping structural changes in north-east Syria. These include the removal of Kurdish leaders from Arab-majority areas, the release of detainees held by the SDF, an equitable allocation of oil revenues to the tribes, and a just trial for former Deir Ezzor Military Council chief Abu Khawla—whose arrest by the SDF prompted the recent outbreak in hostilities. Significantly, tribal leaders are also expressing concerns that the regime or Russia may move to fill any power vacuum that emerges as a result of a weakened Deir Ezzor Military Council or Self Administration. Others have tried to take advantage of the unrest: one Turkish-backed group attempted a brief advance into SDF-held areas, although that advance was swiftly driven back by Russian bombardments. Either way, the conflict has now moved far past its initial catalyst, with Arab tribes now attempting to use the violence to redress what they see as years of political subjugation and economic grievances under Self Administration rule. Ultimately, divided and weakened forces in northeastern Syria will only benefit the Assad regime, which has backed certain reconciled tribal leaders to incite violence in an attempt to destabilize Self Administration control.
Attached Maps:Military Situation in North-East Syria
(For a high-resolution version of this map, please use the form at the bottom of the page)
Deir Ezzor Tribal Conflict
Violent confrontations between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and tribal forces began last week, after the SDF arrested Deir Ezzor Military Council commander Abu Khawla and several of his top associates at a meeting organized by SDF leaders in Hasakeh on 28th August.
Joined by various tribal elements, factions of the Deir Ezzor Military Council retaliated by closing roads, capturing checkpoints, and besieging SDF military sites in eastern Deir Ezzor. While this escalation is significant, armed confrontations with the council and tribal residents had been flaring for weeks prior to the incident. In early August, violence broke out at an SDF checkpoint in a northern Deir Ezzor village after a dispute that left one local resident dead, prompting locals to attack the checkpoint. In another provocation in early August, the SDF shuttered the offices of BAZ News, a media outlet affiliated with the military council. Just days before hostilities broke out, clashes with the SDF and Deir Ezzor Military Council erupted in eastern Deir Ezzor, leaving one council commander injured.
Despite appearing to have the battlefield advantage after clashes initially broke out following Abu Khawla’s arrest, the SDF is now ceding some ground to the military council. Facing a combination of battlefield losses, a rising death toll and hostility from local tribal populations, the SDF withdrew from a string of towns across Deir Ezzor province at the beginning of September. This surprising turn of events has recast the current fighting as a potentially pivotal moment that could ultimately redefine the relationship between the SDF and Arab tribal communities in north-east Syria.
As of 2nd September, the combatant death toll stood at 310, with at least 134 casualties among the SDF and 176 on the side of rebellious tribal forces. The number of casualties will almost certainly rise as clashes continue in towns across eastern Deir Ezzor. In addition, at least 50 civilians were reportedly killed in the crossfire, including a number of children.
Forces from the Turkish-backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya group, a faction of the Syrian National Army (SNA) that is composed of displaced tribesmen from Deir Ezzor, launched a brief advance from Euphrates Shield areas into SDF-controlled territory near Manbij. The group briefly seized a small village before a Russian bombardment drove its fighters back into Euphrates Shield areas. Russia views any southern advancement by Turkish-backed forces as a red line in violation of the Astana Process.
While Abu Khawla and his closest allies remain in custody, the SDF has announced his official removal as head of Deir Ezzor’s council. Abu Khawla has been replaced by Abu Laith a-Sham, another member of Abu Khawla’s tribe, who has been trying to mediate between the SDF and opposing tribal groups.
Ultimately, the regime stands to be the major beneficiary from weakened and divided forces in north-east Syria. Despite increased cooperation with the SDF in some security sectors since the beginning of 2023, Assad still fundamentally views the Self Administration as a breakaway entity that must be reintegrated under regime control through conquest or negotiation.
ISIS Activity
ISIS attacks targeting the SDF were reported in Deir Ezzor, Hasakeh and Raqqa provinces last month, with 11 armed attacks and three IED blasts claiming the lives of at least 13 SDF troops (the actual toll is believed to be higher). ISIS also launched several brutal attacks targeting regime forces, resulting in a surging body count that amounted to the bloodiest period of ISIS violence against regime forces in months. Altogether, at least 11 armed attacks and ambushes by ISIS killed more than 52 regime troops, with scores of other soldiers injured across Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Homs provinces. Several pitched battles between ISIS and regime troops in the central Badia (desert) contributed significantly to losses among pro-Assad forces.
In step with sharply rising anti-regime attacks, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian-backed militias continue to be a growing target for ISIS attacks and IED blasts. A total of three armed attacks and one IED blast killed at least three Iranian-backed forces, although the true death toll is likely much higher.
SDF Activity
SDF counter-terrorism units, backed by coalition troops, carried out operations in Raqqa as well as areas in eastern Deir Ezzor, resulting in the deaths of two suspected ISIS members and the arrest of two others. The SDF also arrested at least 10 people on criminal charges ranging from drug smuggling to attempting to cross into Peace Spring areas.
Russian & Pro-Regime Activity
Following a large uptick in ISIS attacks, regime forces undertook several extensive combing operations in the Palmyra desert to pursue ISIS cells. In conjunction with anti-ISIS operations by the regime, Russia resumed airstrikes in the desert of Raqqa, al-Mayadin and Jabal al-Bishri.
Soldiers at a checkpoint belonging to regime forces intercepted a US-led coalition patrol, preventing their passage in rural Qamishli. No clashes occurred, but several days later residents and regime forces in a rural Qamishli village obstructed the path of another coalition patrol.
Political & Humanitarian Developments
In addition to the waves of protests against the SDF that have rippled across rural Deir Ezzor throughout the current tribal conflict, a number of demonstrations also took place in solidarity with those in Suwayda and Daraa, reflecting the depth of anti-regime sentiment in the region despite the unpopularity of the SDF among tribal communities.
The SDF conducted a number of raids across all sections of the al-Hol camp in recent weeks, arresting several individuals including 26 women and an unknown number of children. During the same period, at least five children died as a result of various medical conditions including from heat stroke. Dozens of tents burned down due to a series of fires in the camp.
While no major repatriations from the camps were completed, a delegation representing the Iraqi Foreign Ministry held discussions with camp authorities, focusing on establishing a framework for repatriating 150 Iraqi families per month from al-Hol to their home country, in collaboration with the SDF. Additionally, camp administrators began relocating a contingent of Kyrgyz women and children in preparations for their return to Kyrgyzstan.
1. Frequency
Newsletter subscribers will receive a maximum of two emails each month.
2. Limited Liability
We reserve the sole right to either modify or discontinue the newsletter at any time and with or without notice. We will not be liable to you or any third party should we exercise such right. Any new features that augment or enhance the then-current services on this site shall also be subject to these Terms of Use.
We reserve the sole right to unsubscribe users / visitors from or newsletter service, without notice. This action will be taken if we discover a subscriber to have registered under a false email address.
3. Double opt-in
We require all subscribers to confirm their email address upon registration. You will therefor receive a message with a link you will need to use in order to confirm your email address and newsletter subscription.
4. Privacy policy
ETANA will not reproduce, sell, or publish your personal date to any third party. You’ may change your subscription settings, or delete it altogether, at any time.
