On Wednesday, 29th January, Syria’s interim authorities confirmed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al-Shara’a (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) as interim president of Syria and approved several other unilateral decisions related to interim governance, including the dissolution of parliament and formation of a HTS-led council tasked with reviewing the now-annulled Assad-era constitution. Despite the lofty optics of al-Shara’a’s ascension to the presidency, the move effectively cements one of the immediate post-Assad political realities: al-Shara’a has in fact acted as the de facto leader of the country since Bashar al-Assad fled the country in early December last year. Potentially more consequential is the HTS directive dissolving parliament, the constitution and the Ba’ath Party, effectively consolidating control of Syria in the hands of HTS-led authorities for the time being and potentially giving them greater powers to shape the future fabric of the Syrian state long after the end of the now-extended interim period in mid-2025. The political announcements came on the heels of a hastily organized meeting earlier in the day between the HTS-led Ministry of Defense and representatives from every major faction inside Syria—that is, apart from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Druze factions from Suwayda. The stage-managed announcement that followed attempted to project legitimacy and political capital, although more complex political dynamics appear to be unfolding behind the scenes.
To the north, signs of escalating lawlessness and violence are on the rise across a geographical area stretching between Homs, Latakia on the coast and Aleppo further east, with near daily instances of killings and militant activity reported across this region in recent weeks. In one massacre, armed gunmen killed at least 13 people and kidnapped dozens of others in the western Homs town of Fahel, while 10 HTS fighters were reportedly killed in attacks around the coastal city of Jableh.
Interim Governance
HTS-led interim authorities announced several unilateral decisions related to interim governance on 29th January, including: the dissolution of Syria’s parliament; the annulling of the Assad-era constitution; the liquidation of the Ba’ath Party; the establishment of a new HTS-appointed legislative council; and a three-month extension of the current interim period, which was originally due to end in March. Perhaps most importantly, HTS leader al-Shara’a appointed himself president until the end of the now-extended interim period, formalizing his de facto role as leader of Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. Shortly after his confirmation, al-Shara’a delivered a “victory speech” to a room full of HTS and factional representatives dressed in military fatigues, setting out his priorities moving forward. While officials also announced the imminent dissolution of all armed factions, including HTS, no new plans or concrete steps were offered to actually progress towards the formation of a post-Assad Syrian army.
The following day, al-Shara’a delivered a televised address, effectively to present the latest political changes to Syrians inside and outside the country. Al-Shara’a spoke about the need to form an “inclusive transitional government,” stressing the importance of civil peace, justice and accountability, Syria’s territorial integrity, institution-building and economic developments. Although many Syrians have noted some of the positive language in the speech—with mentions of key constituencies of the post-2011 uprising and conflict, including detainees, refugees and IDPs, and other victim groups—the order and seemingly hasty organization of meetings and public addresses over the past week suggest that al-Shara’a and interim authorities are still learning how to communicate with the Syrian populace. Additionally, there is still a persistent gulf between al-Shara’a’s public messaging and the centralized, top-down governance approach taken by HTS-led authorities behind closed doors.
Actions by interim authorities are also raising other concerns. The reappointment of former regime-era minister Dr. Diyala Barakat as minister of culture in the interim government has sparked criticism, with critics accusing authorities of favoring figures from the former regime rather than appointing better qualified individuals from the Syrian opposition. Similar controversies have arisen with the appointment of Assad-era judges to a new committee tasked with considering judicial reforms, some of whom are accused of issuing execution orders through the former regime’s brutal system of extraordinary courts. Interim authorities have also projected mixed messages towards wealthy regime-linked business figures, welcoming back some businessmen from exile while the Syrian Central Bank has taken steps to seize the assets of others. Individuals and companies connected to the Al-Qaterji Group, a regime-backed clan and business network infamously linked to fuel smuggling and myriad human rights abuses, had their bank accounts frozen.
Security Dynamics
The security situation has continued to deteriorate across much of northern and central Syria, driven by a waves of tit-for-tat revenge killings and communal violence. The center of this instability is a geographic triangle stretching from Homs province to the coastal region of Latakia in the north-west and towards Aleppo further east, an area that includes multiple Alawi and mixed-sectarian communities. Some armed groups in Alawi areas appear to have re-militarized in response to arrest campaigns directed by interim authorities. At the same time, perpetrators of violence have reportedly been dressing in military fatigues and impersonating security forces, prompting General Security to warn civilians against impersonators conducting unauthorized arrests. Some of the violence is likely being fomented by formerly regime-backed gangs—known as shabiha—suspected of being behind a slew of attacks targeting the HTS-led Military Operations Administration and General Security, including ambushes in Jableh that saw up to a dozen HTS-led security force members killed. In one notable incident, a shabiha attack that killed several General Security members near western Homs’ Fahel prompted a violent retaliation. Seemingly in retaliation, unknown fighters dressed in military fatigues entered Fahel, massacring at least 13 people and detaining 53 others, in one of the worst single acts of extra-judicial violence since the fall of the Assad regime. The group that perpetrated the massacre is still not known.
Security forces have also been accused of involvement in extra-judicial killings, adding fuel to the cycles of violence in certain regions. Worries continue to abound that assassinations and kidnappings have taken on a more sectarian tone, or that targets have simply expanded to encompass any vaguely regime-linked individuals. For example, a former journalist with state news agency SANA in Hama was gunned down and killed by unknown assailants. Other assassinated individuals have included drug dealers and suspected Hezbollah collaborators, while targeting of low-level former soldiers and seemingly random civilians also continued.
Increased ISIS attacks continued to mainly target SDF positions across north-east Syria, with cells striking patrols around Tal Hamis and the Habou area of Hasakeh, killing an unknown number of SDF troops. The frequency of attacks has prompted the SDF to launch anti-ISIS operations in and around Qamishli as well as near Khasham in Deir Ezzor, leading to at least half a dozen arrests. In Daraa, an ISIS cell assassinated the newly appointed police chief in Sheikh Maskin.
Türkiye/SNA & SDF Hostilities in Aleppo & North-East Syria
Frontlines near the Tishreen Dam in eastern rural Aleppo remained stagnant over the past week, with heavy rainfall obscuring battlefield visibility and dampening progress by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). However, fierce clashes have continued near the Tishreen Dam, Deir Hafir and Maskaneh, resulting in more than 20 SDF casualties. Turkish drones and aircraft continued aerial attacks against the SDF in rural areas of Aleppo, Hasakeh and Raqqa. The Tishreen Dam area remains the focal point of Türkiye’s aerial bombardments, in concert with artillery bombardments against SDF positions by SNA factions on the ground. At least four civilians were killed in Turkish airstrikes in the past week.
While the conflict between the SDF and Turkish-backed SNA remains the center of gravity in the north-east, the long-running struggle with tribal militias in Deir Ezzor have remained an irritant for authorities there. Dissident tribal fighters attacked an SDF patrol in Al-Jeninah, just north of Deir Ezzor city, triggering clashes between the two sides that resulted in the deaths of four tribal fighters. The SDF subsequently launched a security campaign in central Deir Ezzor, arresting dozens of individuals with suspected ties to tribal fighters, while also detaining 10 individuals linked to former regime loyalists in Al-Jeninah and Al-Jee’ah.