After weeks of fierce fighting in north-east Syria between interim authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), gradual implementation of the ceasefire/integration agreement reached between the two sides in late January is now underway. This has included several steps that appear, on paper at least, cautiously promising: the appointment of a Kurdish political figure as governor of Hasakeh; the formation of several technical committees to steer political integration of Self Administration institutions into interim governance structures; and reported preparations for the integration of the SDF’s military forces and Asayish security forces. Even so, the inherent complexities in reconciling two largely opposite political, social and economic projects, combined with the relative openness of the agreement to interpretation and its treatment so far as a merely technical matter rather than the subject of complex politics, leaves space for potential disputes and spoilers moving forward.
Background
Between December and the end of January, interim authorities and the SDF engaged in a series of consecutive military hostilities, beginning in Aleppo before pro-government forces advanced deep into the SDF-held north-east. By the time fighting paused to give space for negotiations in late January, the SDF had been forced into two effective enclaves—one in Kobane/Ain al-Arab in north-east rural Aleppo and another in the north-east half of Hasakeh province—that remain the territorial status quo today. The agreement ultimately reached included 14 points covering: military and security arrangements (including, crucially, the phased integration of SDF cadres into new brigades under the interim Ministry of Defense); oil and gas governance; border crossings; education; local administration; and the return of displaced persons.
Opportunities & Benefits from the Agreement
The agreement gives the interim administration in Damascus access to key, long-coveted economic resources in the north-east—not least the lion’s share of Syria’s oil and gas infrastructure. This increases the possibility of a comprehensive national development strategy involving all areas of Syria contributing to, and benefiting from, much-needed economic growth.
The collapse of the SDF-held north-east has facilitated the removal of checkpoints and thus the relatively free movement of goods and people for the first time in years. This will contribute to lower prices for goods, services and labour, as greater mobility of resources and goods will help reduce cross-line price disparities and promote a more balanced, integrated national market. Looking further forward, increased commercial and civilian movement will help to erode wartime divisions and, in the longer term, to build trust between different regions and communities.
The agreement gives Kurdish-led authorities in Hasakeh governance authority over local public institutions, including in the security and civil sectors, and therefore establishes a precedent contrary to the highly centralized consolidation of power (whether state vs. local, executive vs. legislative or Sunni vs. minority) overseen by interim President Ahmad al-Shara’a’s administration since December 2024. At the same time, rather than providing a constructive, positive model for decentralization in other areas of the country (as one presided over by existing elites, only Kurdish/SDF-affiliated rather than state/HTS-affiliated ones), the agreement could solidify the control of authoritarian, albeit less sectarian, authorities in the north-east without engaging local communities and building a more representative, inclusive governance model from the outside in.
Challenges & Risks from the Agreement
While the agreement presents, in principle, several important opportunities, its lack of detail concerning complex mechanisms and procedures, the initial treatment of complex political struggles as merely technical matters, and the dire need for improvements in representative, inclusive governance in the north-east and the rest of the country could undermine any potential benefits and sow future conflicts in the process. Here, there are four main issues to consider: political integration, the economy, representation and inclusivity, and military and security.
On the first point, there is so far no clear mechanism for implementing the Damascus-SDF agreement. Only one article of the agreement deals with the infinitely complex process of integrating political entities under the SDF-affiliated Self Administration into interim governance structures. There is no specific timeline or implementation mechanism mentioned, an ambiguity that will foster competing interpretations of what form political integration should take. In addition, The agreement states that interim authorities will retain SDF-appointed public sector employees in their positions, but also mentions that the government has the right to appoint its own personnel. This arrangement will likely generate competing blocs within state institutions in the north-east, particularly in Hasakeh, thereby recalibrating institutional divisions without fixing them and reducing the efficiency, quality and legitimacy of service provision.
The SDF’s Kurdish-led Rojava experiment in the north-east and the interim government linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) represent two profoundly different political and social projects, with almost polar opposite views on governance, secularism, women’s roles in society and authority. The agreement’s initial integration architecture—which frames the integration of one incongruous system into another as a purely technical matter—remains vague and lacks accountability. This ambiguity could yield local power struggles and in symbolic and contested places like Kobane, Hasakeh and Qamishli, local communities will pay the price for any failure in coordination or political imagination.
Meanwhile, interim officials have framed the newfound control of north-east Syria’s oil and gas sectors as game-changers in the post-Assad recovery. In theory, the state’s access to oil and energy infrastructure could ease a nationwide crisis in electricity, fuel and public revenue shortages, but only if distribution is equitable and fair. Otherwise, resource control will harden existing divisions and inequalities, and perpetuate the threat of conflict further into the future. More broadly, the equitable distribution of resources can only serve as a peace divided if it is accompanied by transparent revenue-sharing, local reinvestment (especially in sectors that badly need it, such as reconstruction and services) and visible benefits on the ground. If not, “national resources” will quickly come to be seen as “someone else’s wealth”—not least in areas that have only just come under the tight financial control of central government in Damascus.
On the third point of legitimacy, one of the interim government’s key arguments against the SDF in the run-up to recent hostilities was that, as a decentralized, minority-led non-state project, it lacked legitimacy to rule. But like the SDF, HTS-linked interim authorities have demonstrated little commitment to inclusion, representation and trust since assuming power more than a year ago—a fact evidenced by ETANA’s surveys from June and December 2025 on regional and sectarian inequalities. Hopefulness on the country’s direction varies by sect: 87% of Sunni respondents reported feeling optimistic about Syria’s post-Assad trajectory, compared to just 45% of those from all other religious segments. While significant, changes in the map of control in Syria do nothing to change this: instead, steps towards distribution of resources and inclusive governance must be genuine and substantial, rather than cosmetic.
The agreement also focuses too heavily on the integration of the SDF as a military force, whereas some of the more enduring challenges relate to rights, inclusion and representation. Territorial reunification can become a platform for more inclusive governance, defined for the first time by the periphery rather than the center, provided that interim authorities invest in relationships with communities (rather than just elites) by maintaining and improving services, protecting employment, establishing credible representation and turning rights guarantees into lived practice rather than symbolic gestures.
Critically, the threat of extremism has not been eradicated. The shift in power in the north-east merely changed the shape of risks posed by ISIS, rather than erasing them. The sometimes-chaotic handover of camps and detention sites creates a dangerous window in which ISIS could exploit institutional confusion, weak oversight or human rights abuses.
Policy Considerations for Damascus
To better implement the agreement, ETANA recommends that Syria’s interim authorities implement/consider the following three actions:
- Clarify the implementation framework: A detailed implementation plan, including clear phases and procedural steps, should be publicly announced and published in a transparent manner. A permanent joint technical committee, formed of technocrats and independent civil representatives from all sides, should oversee implementation and issue periodic public reports to enhance predictability, accountability and dispute prevention;
- Rights & representation: Rights, inclusion, and representation cannot be postponed in favour of security-first integration. The idea that you can centralise power now and liberalise later has failed too many times to be treated as a serious strategy;
- Local, civilian-facing conflict management: Joint civilian-security mediation teams, rapid incident review, and real penalties for incitement or abuse are important tools for preventing small sparks from becoming large fires.
The most immediate and significant achievement of the agreement so far has been the prevention of continued armed confrontation between interim authorities and the SDF. While this agreement came about with the SDF on the backfoot and in a state of collapse on the battlefield, interim authorities should resist the temptation of triumphalism and instead treat the integration process as an opportunity to rebuild trust, representation and everyday governance.
