Israel’s escalation in Lebanon has already caused massive displacements within a matter of weeks. Around a million people are now internally displaced within Lebanon. Another 258,000—including around 70% Syrians, 30% Lebanese and small numbers of other affected nationalities—have fled into Syria since late September, according to UNHCR. Crossings are expected to continue while hostilities in Lebanon are ongoing.
At official crossings, Syrian authorities are temporarily waiving a mandatory $100 entry fee, paid in US dollars, that has been in place since 2020. Security checks for Syrians are being thoroughly implemented—although were briefly waived for a few days last week until the Israeli strike at the Al-Masna’a border crossing on 4th October. The regime’s use of security checks poses a clear protection risk for wanted persons and would-be conscripts. Tens of men deemed “wanted” by the regime have already been detained in Damascus and Homs.
Current refugee movements into Syria do not change the fact that Syria is not a safe returns context. As such, the current situation should not be used to make preliminary policy determinations about regime behavior and “safe” conditions in regime-held areas—let alone anywhere else in the country. While detentions at the border are already taking place, the regime has an extensive range of repressive and prosecutorial tools at its disposal to process returnees and pursue perceived dissidents, or anyone with links to them, long after they return. Events over the past few weeks should not form the basis for preliminary policy determinations on the feasibility of refugee returns, especially when there is no independent mechanism for post-returns monitoring.
Refugees fleeing the current crisis in Lebanon for Syria also present opportunities for Bashar al-Assad: the regime can point to hundreds of thousands of returning Syrians and shelters hosting Lebanese refugees as evidence of its “post-conflict” narrative that Syria is safe, furthering its long-term objectives of normalization, increased aid and sanctions relief. But without reforms and better protections, detentions and punitive measures will continue to take place whenever new groups of returnees enter Syria—this is how the system is built to operate, as a matter of procedure.
Background
In mid-September, Israel’s security cabinet announced its intention to escalate conflict with Hezbollah, supposedly with the aim of “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes.” After two days of attacks using weaponized pagers and walkie-talkies to target Hezbollah fighters and civilians, Israel significantly escalated airstrikes against Hezbollah targets and civilian areas from 23rd September before launching a ground invasion on 1st October. To date, airstrikes have largely concentrated on south Lebanon and Dahiyeh in Beirut but also hit targets as far afield as Tripoli, prompting massive internal displacements across the country (around 1.2 million people) as well as immense civilian casualties—with at least 2,000 killed to date, according to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health.
Syrian refugees in Lebanon continue to be caught amid the violence, both as displaced persons and casualties. While refugees and migrant workers in Lebanon have faced mounting xenophobia and discrimination for years, anti-refugee sentiment surged after Israeli strikes killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah last month, with some Lebanese blaming Syrians for the attack. This dynamic also pushed some Syrians to consider returning despite the dangers they may face in Syria.
Entry Regulations & Reception
Syrians at the border have balked at the different treatment for Lebanese and Syrians refugees by Syrian authorities. There are effectively two systems in place for Lebanese and Syrian nationals at official border crossings—in terms of entry requirements and access to aid and services. There is no requirement for Lebanese nationals to present IDs or pay the mandatory $100 entry fee; Syrians, on the other hand, must present IDs and were initially expected to pay. Lebanese refugees are reportedly being looked after by Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and Hezbollah/Iranian-affiliated relief groups who, for example, transport them from the border to collective shelters set up for Lebanese refugees in Damascus and Rural Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia and Tartous—services that are not being offered to almost all returning Syrians.
When displacements into Syria first began, Syrian border authorities kept crossings open but still required Syrians to present IDs and pay the $100 entry fee. By the end of September, authorities waived the $100 entry fee for Syrians and, for a short time, did not require Syrians to present their IDs. Following the Israeli strike that hit the Al-Masna’a crossing on 4th October, however, Syrians now must present their IDs and receive a stamp before entering the country. The fee waiver will remain in place until mid-October. Effectively, this means Syrians must undergo a mandatory security check, with every name checked against lists maintained at official crossings for wanted persons and military-age males required to serve in the Syrian army.
While UNHCR is present at official crossings and providing limited services alongside the SARC, the agency cannot monitor returnees’ situations after they enter Syria. There is no independent mechanism for UNHCR or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor the status and safety of Syrians displaced from Lebanon and returning to Syria.
SARC aid workers are present in the border area between Al-Masna’a and Jdeidet Yabous, providing limited services including transportation for vulnerable cases and food. Some returnees may be reluctant to engage with SARC aid centers because of the organization’s historic coordination with regime security agencies.
وصول قرابة 2000 مهجر سوري من #لبنان إلى ريف #حلب عبر معبر عون الدادات pic.twitter.com/oFXvR2IFG9
— محمد ابو الهدى الحمصي (@aboalhodaalhoms) October 3, 2024
Protection Implications
Since security checks were introduced on 4th October, tens of Syrians have been detained at an official crossing bordering Homs and boarded onto buses, although it is unclear whether they were detained for military conscription or political reasons. A report by Syrian outlet Al-Jumhuriya also indicates that another 40 people were arrested at the Pullman Garages bus station near Al-Qaboun in eastern Damascus city and in Homs after returning from Lebanon, although ETANA has been unable to independently verify these reports.
Military-age males among returnees who did not desert before leaving Syria and who have never served in the military are being handed summons to present themselves at their local military recruitment office within 15 days after their arrival to Syria. These men’s places of return and personal details are recorded by border officials.
Security checks and a growing trend of detentions mean that Syrians who suspect they might face security issues from regime authorities are now more likely to seek out alternative routes through the more than 25 informal border crossings along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Humanitarian agencies estimate that more than 100,000 Syrians, many of them men, have already crossed through these informal routes since late September. UNHCR estimates that 60% of Syrian returnees are children, with many male relatives opting to stay behind in Lebanon, leaving families separated. This indicates how large numbers of Syrians—and particularly men—continue to view return to regime-held areas as very risky in lieu of any semblance of meaningful security or transitional justice reform.
Although the proportion of detainees is comparatively small to the total number of returning Syrians for now, it is important to remember that detentions and conscriptions are part of the regime’s standard operating procedure—if a name appears on a list, their trajectory upon return is set. Return risks do not stop once a returnee has crossed the border: there are several ways that the regime can seek out returnees once they settle in regime-held areas. When a new returnee applies for services or civil status documentation, their name will be flagged to security agencies if they are wanted or designated as a person of interest. Mouraja’a (review) summons are a common tactic used by security branches, whereby returnees are “invited” for supposedly informal conversations at security branches that can turn into detention situations after days, weeks or even months of repeat summons and interrogations. Localized revenge provides another ground for detention and prosecution: for years, civilians and local regime cronies have used malicious lawsuits as one way of settling old scores and ensnaring individuals, families and whole communities accused of opposition activity since 2011.
Onward Displacements to North-west Syria
Thousands of Syrians have opted for long journeys—some taking as long as a week—towards areas of north-west Syria held by Türkiye and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) via the Aoun al-Dadat crossing, which is located north of Manbij in areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As of 10th October, UNHCR recorded at least 3,000 new arrivals from Lebanon to north-west Syria. At the time of reporting, another 1,000 were waiting to cross into northern Aleppo. Returnees traveling through regime-controlled areas to reach the north-west report being extorted and harassed at regime checkpoints, especially those run by the 4th Division, paying up to hundreds of dollars per family to pass.
Local gangs with reported links to regime forces and are extorting civilians waiting at the Aoun al-Dadat crossing for hundreds of dollars before allowing them to pass. Northward crossings at Aoun al-Dadat are beset by extended closures and long waiting times, with Türkiye reportedly imposing intensive background checks on civilians to seek out potential Hezbollah and ISIS affiliates travelling among the displaced. Because of the chaotic situation and long wait-times, many are opting to pay smugglers hundreds of dollars to enter SNA-held areas irregularly or exorbitant bribes to border authorities in the hope of getting across quicker.
Largely left to fend for themselves, Syrians stranded at Aoun al-Dadat require all kinds of humanitarian assistance including essential supplies such as food, water, and shelter as well as onward transportation to other opposition-held areas. Baby formula is consistently cited as one of the most urgent needs. Humanitarian responses so far have been slow to meet needs on the ground: for days, no organization distributed aid, water, medicine or relief baskets in SNA-held areas, although preparations are now underway—including an emergency reception camp on the SNA side of Aoun al-Dadat.
