A street quarrel between two Sunni men and local Christians in the Orthodox town of Al-Suqaylabiyeh in north-west Hama escalated into sectarian violence last week, when Sunni residents from the neighboring town retaliated by attacking and burning down Christian properties in Al-Suqaylabiyeh. In the days since events in Al-Suqaylabiyeh, there has been debate—particularly online—about the extent to which sectarianism caused the incident or simply foregrounded it. What is most likely is that sectarianism represented one component of a multi-layered issue: a map of the surrounding area of north-west Hama and wider central Syria would show war-time divisions between regime/opposition-held territory broadly matching up with contiguous zones of multi-sectarian/predominantly Sunni areas. As such, the “individual” incident in Al-Suqaylabiyeh quickly touched on sensitive, longstanding tensions and grievances that are simultaneously political and sectarian. The either ineffectual or actively complicit role of local Internal Security units in sectarian violations raises serious question-marks about its efficacy as a law enforcement agency that treats and protects all Syrians equally regardless of location or sect.
Background
Home to approximately 18,000 people before 2024, Al-Suqaylabiyeh is a predominantly Greek Orthodox Christian town in Hama province’s north-west countryside. The town remained under regime control throughout the post-2011 conflict, but for years was located just a few kilometers from frontline areas facing the opposition-held north-west. Its sectarian composition and wartime geography therefore contributed to a notable degree of pro-regime militiafication, although there is debate about the extent to which this was founded on innate, ideological support for the regime or a self-image as a sectarian bulwark close to Sunni, opposition-held areas viewed by some as an existential threat.
After 2013, men from Al-Suqaylabiyeh joined various local pro-regime militia initiatives including the National Defense Forces (NDF) and smaller militias linked to the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and local self-defense groups. Local NDF commander Nabil al-Abdullah was regarded as complicit in abuses against communities in Hama, and was sanctioned for allegedly recruiting mercenaries to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine; he fled Syria for Russia following the collapse of the regime in December 2024.
This is not the first bout of heightened sectarian tensions in Al-Suqaylabiyeh since the regime’s collapse: most notably, in December 2024 a Christmas tree in a public square in the town was burned down, prompting nationwide and international criticism and careful expressions of support from HTS-aligned interim officials that minorities would be protected under the new administration. Meanwhile, predominantly Sunni Bedouin residents of nearby communities have also been known to harass Christians from Al-Suqaylabiyeh, often citing wartime abuses by regime forces against Sunni communities in the area.
Sectarian Incident in Al-Suqaylabiyeh
The most recent clashes began on 27th March when two young Sunni men from Qala’at al-Madiq travelled to Al-Suqaylabiyeh to visit a doctor; one was carrying a pistol under his jacket. After their appointment, the two men tried to enter central Al-Suqaylabiyeh’s Meshwar Street, a well-known thoroughfare with numerous cafes and coffee shops; local community elders have tried to block access to the street to outsiders not from the town. After repeated attempts to enter the street that attracted the ire of local Christian youths, a fight ultimately broke out in which one of the two men from Qala’at al-Madiq was injured. Unverified reports indicate that local Whatsapp groups spread news that one of the men had been killed, further inflaming tensions.
The men from Qala’at al-Madiq returned to their hometown, and news of what happened rallied Sunni residents of Qala’at al-Madiq to attack Al-Suqaylabiyeh. This first wave was tribal in nature, including at least 100 civilians and off-duty Internal Security members who are also from the area. Overnight, the Qala’at al-Madiq crowd burnt, vandalized and looted local Christian-owned businesses in Al-Suqaylabiyeh. Allegations suggest that local Internal Security commanders may have had foreknowledge of the plan to attack Al-Suqlabiyeh but did nothing to stop it. After Christian clergymen in Damascus complained to interim government officials about what was transpiring in the Hama countryside, an Internal Security force from Hama city was dispatched to Al-Suqaylabiyeh.
Violence continued until this point, and it was the non-local Internal Security force from Hama who expelled the crowd from Qala’at al-Madiq under threat of force. They also arrested five young men from Al-Suqaylabiyeh, who they considered to be the instigators of the violence. The men were released hours later. The following day, members of Al-Suqaylabiyeh’s Christian community held a silent march, carrying banners that demanded protection and control measures on unregulated weapons. Residents of Qala’at al-Madiq considered the march a provocation and headed towards Al-Suqaylabiyeh in large numbers, but Internal Security troops prevented them from entering the town.
On the first day of unrest, an initial meeting brought together local tribal elders, Christian community figures and other dignitaries in attempt to calm the situation. This paved the way for a second meeting, chaired by Hama Internal Security chief Mulhem al-Shantout, that included interim officials, local dignitaries and church leaders. Residents of Al-Suqaylabiyeh originally requested compensation for the damaged property be paid by residents of Qala’at al-Madiq; however, residents of Qala’at al-Madiq in turn requested compensation for abuses incurred by them at the hands of pro-regime militias from Al-Suqaylabiyeh during the post-2011 conflict. Ultimately, attendees reached an agreement that would see interim authorities and the Greek Orthodox Church compensate members of the Christian community in Al-Suqaylabiyeh.
Interim authorities are downplaying the Al-Suqaylabiyah incident and instead framing it through three different approaches, claiming: the clashes were local rather than sectarian, the situation was resolved through state-led peaceful dialogue, and that the state protects Syrian Christians. Soon after the incident, local authorities in Hama framed the incident as “of an individual nature” rather than the result of broader sectarian strife. In the days since the incident, authorities have published photos of Christians celebrating Palm Sunday and of the security presence at churches for protection. The interim Ministry of information subsequently published a report claiming that social media actors outside Syria played a large role in the circulation of negative social media reports about events in Al-Suqaylabiyeh.
While the interim administration cannot be blamed for these issues, the amount of sectarian distrust (and Sunni exceptionalism) seen in different parts of Syria since December 2024 can be seen as a direct result of regime-era abuses as well as policies introduced since interim President Ahmad al-Shara’a took power. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse, central Syria’s historically diverse western reaches—a patchwork of multi-sectarian (Alawi, Christian, Shia and Sunni) communities covering the agricultural plains and hilltops of western Hama and Homs provinces—became an epicenter of often-sectarianized reprisals perpetrated by fledgling interim security forces, HTS-backed factions and unknown armed groups acting in their name; subsequent armed attacks on Syria’s coast and Suwayda did little to reassure minority communities. Continued inter-communal tensions will only perpetuate cycles of violence in the absence of meaningful, non-politicized and inclusive transitional justice mechanisms to heal the many wounds of Syria’s Assadist past.
At the very least, the latest incident is undoubtedly a product of wartime divisions: Al-Suqaylabiyeh remained under regime control throughout the conflict, during which the town acted as a kind of bastion of regime militiafication close to front-line areas with the opposition-held north-west. The town is therefore a microcosm of how regime-era abuses, wartime divisions and sectarian demographics combine and continue to play out in different areas of the country.
