Authorities led by caretaker President Ahmad al-Shara’a are watching with growing concern the sustained opposition to their objectives in the south Syrian Druze-majority province. Calls from senior Druze cleric Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri for a “decentralized system” in Suwayda stand in direct opposition to authorities’ objectives—not least the integration of all southern armed factions under a new Ministry of Defense. Although there have been muted signs of progress on this front—on 17th February, caretaker authorities announced an agreement with opposition factions in Daraa and Quneitra to form a ‘Southern Division’ within the new Syrian army—the fate of Suwayda’s armed groups is less clear. Shortly after, al-Hijri publicly remarked that the Druze were communicating with Damascus but appeared resistant to accept their overall political control. Tensions between Suwayda’s Druze community and the authorities in Damascus have played out in other arenas recently: all but one of the Druze factions invited to attend al-Shara’a’s “victory conference” last month boycotted the event. The boycott reflects an unprecedented degree of unity within Suwayda’s political and military landscape, with political groups and factions standing together against what they see as unwelcome interference from outside the province.
Background
Although most of Suwayda’s population adopted a position of “neutrality” at the outbreak of the 2011 Syrian uprising, the province has been historically divided between those who remained loyal to Assad, supported the opposition, or preferred neutrality. An early anti-regime protest movement did emerge, but the province soon gained more of a reputation as an area of safety for wanted persons, military-age men and others fleeing regime violence. Tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arrived fleeing from regime violence in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs and other provinces. Defectors and those fleeing military service also took shelter across Suwayda, with most young men in the province not joining military service, or actively opposing it.
In more recent years, regime attempts at interference in the province alienated prominent figures in the religious establishment: after years as a reliable regime ally within Suwayda, Sheikh al-Hijri after 2021 began to question regime objectives and publicly criticized Assad for interfering in Suwayda’s internal affairs. But it was the growing financial crisis coupled with regime misgovernance that tipped the scales towards the protest movement that broke out in August 2023.
More than a year leading up to the lightning offensive that saw Al-Sharaa assume caretaker governance in Damascus, Suwayda’s residents launched a peaceful protest movement denouncing the Assad regime. The movement first erupted in August 2023 after the regime abruptly cut fuel subsidies during a nationwide economic collapse. In the year since, protesters managed to sustain a vocally anti-regime movement that directly called for the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad alongside other socio-economic and systemic political demands. Throughout, Sheikh al-Hijri sought to position himself as the head and spokesman of the movement, and the center of gravity in Suwayda. This is a role he has reprised since Assad’s ouster: opposing caretaker authorities’ attempts to assume control over Suwayda and coordinating with other actors inside Syria that are more distrustful of the intentions of the new authorities in Damascus. Although there is always the risk of overreach, al-Shara’a and caretaker authorities appear to acknowledge a need for sensitivity in Suwayda, because of its minority status but also the implicit interests of significant regional players in Israel and Jordan.
Post-Assad Status Quo
The fall of the regime precipitated the collapse of regime-affiliated political parties (chiefly, the Ba’ath Party), effectively ceding the political ground to groups involved in the post-August 2023 protest movement, namely: the Forces for Civil Change; Civil Political Body (Civil Forum); Democratic People’s Party; Democratic Arab Socialist Union Party; Federal Syria Current; communist parties; and some smaller and largely inactive parties. There are currently three active political alliances in Suwayda: the National Forces Alliance (which comprises about 80% of all political groups in the province) and then two smaller coalitions (the Freedom of Change Current and the Supreme Political Council).
As for the military scene, there are approximately 160 organized armed groups in Suwayda at present. Of the 160 organized armed groups, 62 are organized into four different operations rooms:
With the regime gone, Suwayda’s political and factional milieu is more united than ever before even though the results are still complex and fractious. Unfortunately for caretaker authorities, this newly unified Druze position is opposed to current attempts in Damascus to consolidate authority and disarm armed groups across all areas of Syria—which many in Suwayda see as an impalatable submission to an Islamist project diametrically opposed to Suwayda’s predominantly Druze political, ethnic and religious make-up.
Divisions, Concerns & Points of Tension
As Syria’s Druze-majority province, there are several historic reasons for Druze distrust of the new status quo. In its previous incarnations as Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham perpetrated a massacre, property confiscations and other abuses against Druze communities in north-west Syria. Suwayda’s political landscape meanwhile tends to be informed by Arabism, nationalism, the Druze faith and a rejection of undue outside interference by central authorities or foreign powers—all of which stand in opposition to the conservative Sunni Salafi-jihadism (however reformed it might be) represented by al-Shara’a and HTS.
This goes some way to explaining opposition in Suwayda to recent initiatives by al-Shara’a and caretaker authorities more broadly. Last month, caretaker President al-Shara’a led a hastily organized and stage-managed “victory conference,” attended by most armed factions in Syria, to announce several unilateral governance reforms. All factions from Suwayda’s Joint Operations Room were invited but boycotted the event; one faction leader who expressed an interest in attending was then effectively prevented from doing so. Just six of Suwayda’s political parties expressed support for al-Shara’a’s victory speech, the most prominent of these being the Democratic People’s Party and the Socialist Union.
Publicly, caretaker authorities have conveyed that they are engaging in governance talks to make progress on several files—including the disarmament and integration of non-state armed groups under a new, post-Assad Ministry of Defense—led by Damascus’ delegated envoy for coordinating with Suwayda, Mustafa Bakour. While national police and criminal security forces were reactivated in the province last month, there is still sustained opposition to administration of Suwayda’s political, military and religious affairs from outside the province.
Suwayda’s political groups and military factions are, by and large, opposed to the entry of HTS-led caretaker authorities into Suwayda, with Sheikh al-Hijri acting as the political center of gravity for this position. Most political groups have continued to coalesce around al-Hijri, albeit for different political reasons and motivations. However, since the fall of the regime, al-Hijri has tended to rely on a smaller group of experts around him rather than a broader consultative cross-section of Suwayda’s political landscape, prompting anger from some political groups.
Caretaker authorities have subsequently sought to exploit these divisions to erode al-Hijri’s authority and influence in the province, including by publicly lending support to protests criticizing al-Hijri and/or calling for Suwayda to integrate fully with the new authorities in Damascus—potentially a way to gain ground inside Suwayda outside of official talks. In late January, for example, a demonstration in Suwayda city denounced calls for self-rule in the province; caretake envoy Bakour responded by calling these protesters the “real support for the revolution and change.” In mid-January, a new armed group calling itself the Unified Army (Jaish al-Muwahidoun) was announced; its founding statement echoed similar demands calling for Suwayda’s integration into the new Syrian state.
