The 8th May airstrike that killed smuggling kingpin Marai al-Ramthan fundamentally altered the state of drug smuggling in south Syria, already a hotspot of instability. Despite the regime’s performative engagement with regional counter-smuggling efforts, normalization has not translated into any real decline in smuggling or the regime’s facilitation of it. Recent dips in cross-border activity have little to do with political action, but instead reflect normal fluctuations due to changing weather conditions and over-caution among smugglers in the wake of Ramthan’s death. Although some smugglers went into hiding or even quit the trade altogether, the majority have only temporarily ceased activities and will likely return to the border strip once the political situation settles. Otherwise, the regime has made no structural changes to the network in the south—Military Intelligence still maintains direct or indirect control over three-quarters of the south’s drug infrastructure—but instead has only tweaked its policies regarding how and where smuggling takes place. Preparations are underway to push smuggling operations further east into more remote stretches of desert while drones are becoming an increasingly useful and harder-to-trace method for smugglers to move product into Jordan. Lighter and easier to transport, crystal meth is also becoming a favorable and lucrative narcotic for smugglers. While recent protests in Suwayda have seen Military Intelligence divert manpower away from the border to focus on the situation inside Suwayda itself, this is reflective of manpower shortages and disquiet within the security apparatus rather than some new commitment to divesting from the smuggling trade.
Attached Files:
Maps: Military Intelligence Withdraws from Southern Desert Region
Summary: Key Findings
Upended Drug Trade: Marai al-Ramthan’s sudden removal terrified smugglers—many of whom either went into hiding, concealed their assets or quit the trade altogether. His death also meant that vast sums of owed profits were left unpaid, leading to financial disputes, inter-group tensions and a growing trend of assassinations.
Reduction in Smuggling Infrastructure: In Daraa and Suwayda, up to 75% of previously active cross-border and internal smuggling groups folded in the wake of Ramthan’s death, either disbanding altogether or temporarily ceasing activities. Most currently inactive groups have only paused activities, meaning they can be reactivated once the situation allows.
Responses & Coping Strategies: In the meantime, active networks refocused attentions on local distribution, flooding the market with drugs while crossing a previous red line by expanding the trade in crystal meth. Meth is easier to transport and is now cheaper than ever before.
New Geographical Focus: Smuggling networks are moving operations east, further away from inhabited areas and into the most remote stretches of desert along the provincial borders of south-east Suwayda and south-east Rural Damascus. Once again, Military Intelligence is overseeing this work but concealing its involvement to give the regime some degree of plausible deniability. The agency still maintains control over around three-quarters of the drug infrastructure in south Syria.
Increasing Use of Drones: Smugglers still working on cross-border transport are now relying on drones to transport their product at a time when it is more profitable to fly powdered crystal meth rather than attempt risky smuggling crossings on foot.
Empty Regime Crackdown: The regime felt it necessary to launch a series of largely symbolic, theatrical measures supposed to flag its purported commitment to combatting smuggling—including arrests of several smugglers (some of whom were forewarned). However, structural changes to the smuggling network should be considered temporary. Some 80% of smuggling groups that halted their activities are only temporarily inactive and the regime will likely reactivate networks once the situation becomes clearer. In the meantime, the regime is using a counter-terrorism narrative to excuse its limited progress in satisfying regional counter-smuggling demands.
Transforming the South’s Drug Trade
In early May, Damascus agreed to collaborate with Jordan and Iraq to form joint political and security teams to identify sources of drug production, smuggling operations and the networks that manage them. It was this quid pro quo presented to the regime—partial regional normalization in return for progress made on narcotics smuggling—that paved the way for Syria’s readmission to the Arab League.
On 8th May, airstrikes targeted the south-east Suwayda home of Marai al-Ramthan—one of the most prominent drug dealers and smugglers in south Syria—and a desalination plant in western Daraa that was previously used as a drug storage warehouse. Ramthan was killed along with several of his family members, including six children.
Ramthan’s death has left south Syria in its most unpredictable, unstable state in years. He was not just a smuggler: he represented the head of a vast network of local smuggling networks responsible for distributing labor among the various border smuggling groups and collecting shares on behalf of the powerful intelligence officers who oversee them. He was also Military Intelligence’s key partner on the ground.
In the immediate aftermath, the smuggling world went into a tailspin. Smuggling groups folded in on themselves out of fear of similar targeted attacks, and tons of narcotics sat spoiling in warehouses with no hope of cross-border transport. The rate of activity of smuggling network groups in both Daraa and Suwayda declined after Ramthan’s death, however this decline has not translated into a permanent change in status quo—i.e., the regime permanently disbanding smuggling groups and ending its engagement with the cross-border trade. If anything, there is a growing recognition within the regime that drug networks need to be rebuilt once again to respond to the new rules of engagement and to repair the financial disputes left in their wake. Most of the groups disbanded after Ramthan’s death have done so temporarily, meaning it is likely that groups will return to the trade with the coming of more favorable wintry conditions after September.
Monitoring Changes to South Syria’s Drug Network
Security Dynamics
Timed in conjunction with the Amman Consultative Meeting and the Arab League summit two weeks later, the regime conducted a number of highly publicized raids against drug storage warehouses in the south, creating the appearance of a crackdown on smuggling networks largely for the benefit of the regime’s regional diplomatic push for normalization. Military Intelligence has been the primary actor responsible for this, and the agency allowed its regional branch in Suwayda to formally take on the role of presenting itself as a force committed to combating smuggling.
Structure of Smuggling Networks
Although Military Intelligence’s reorganization of the smuggling network during the beginning of 2023 marginally reduced the number of groups either directly or indirectly linked to smuggling in Daraa, it also resulted in an increase in the number of smuggling groups in southern and southeastern Suwayda (towards the provincial border with Rural Damascus). With 119 groups in Suwayda and 34 groups in Daraa, there were 153 groups active in south Syria on the eve of Ramthan’s killing.
Ramthan’s assassination quickly disrupted the structure of the smuggling network in all areas of Daraa and Suwayda. The immediate aftermath of his death was defined by panic: smugglers went into hiding and quickly began moving assets and storage warehouses away from the border, either in fear of similar airstrikes or the threat of opportunistic robberies from other smuggling groups.
The majority of smuggling and transport groups either halted their activities and moved away from the border or disbanded altogether. A minority remained in place to continue smuggling and transit operations. Changes in the wake of Ramthan’s death therefore led to an approximately 75% reduction in both the number of groups on the ground, as well as the number of personnel involved in the trade.
In Suwayda, the number of active smuggling groups in Suwayda decreased from 119 to 27 groups, leaving just 23% of the number of groups that existed before May 2023. Meanwhile in Daraa, the number of active smuggling groups decreased from 34 groups to just nine groups: a 74% decrease compared to early May. Many of the groups who stopped their activities after Ramthan’s death did so temporarily and may return to the trade in the winter.
Changes in Supply Chains
The shock of Ramthan’s death paralyzed smuggling operations in both Daraa and Suwayda, leading to a backlog of drug shipments in warehouses that were originally intended for cross-border smuggling. Faced with the prospect of massive amounts of product simply sitting in warehouses for months and spoiling, merchants and smugglers were left with the decision to turn away from the border and flood the local market with hashish, Captagon and, increasingly, crystal meth. This reactive step effectively abolished the previous role of the major drug distributors, meaning the entire distribution system collapsed and left networks in need of restructuring. Before early May, large distribution warehouses were used to temporarily house and expedite onward distribution of drug shipments once they arrived in the border strip.
Smuggling Networks’ Regime Affiliations
Tasked with comprehensively restructuring the smuggling trade in south Syria at the beginning of 2023, Military Intelligence had already vastly increased its control over the entire smuggling apparatus. By the spring, 79% of the total drug network in Suwayda was either directly or indirectly affiliated with Military Intelligence, compared with 63% of the total drug network in Daraa.
Even with the recent reductions in the number of smuggling groups, Military Intelligence’s control over the network has remained largely unchanged. In Suwayda, Military Intelligence still controls 76% of all active groups, a tiny reduction compared with the period prior to Ramthan’s assassination. Military Intelligence is also still the primary affiliated actor in Daraa, controlling 60% of all active groups in Daraa province.

Smuggling Modus Operandi
New Geographical Focus
The reorganization of the smuggling network during the beginning of 2023 had already reduced the number of groups linked to smuggling in Daraa, resulting in an increase in the number of smuggling groups in south and south-east Suwayda. This appeared to reflect a shift towards the eastern strip of the south Syrian border, an area that is less inhabited and more remote. This trend has only continued, with smuggling groups—operating in concert with Military Intelligence—moving further east towards south-east Suwayda’s provincial border with Rural Damascus.
Increasing Use of Drones
Drones are not a new innovation for smuggling networks in south Syria. However, the practice has more recently expanded as smugglers have agreed to trade in crystal meth and in response to tightening border security measures. UAVs have a higher success rate than smuggling operations conducted on foot during the 2022-2023 high season for smuggling (which saw about one-third of all attempts succeed)—one of several reasons that it is expected the next smuggling season will see continued use of drones. Reflective of the tightening security restrictions at the border and move towards crystal meth, the increased use of drones may also give the regime plausible deniability—a less visible, traceable kind of smuggling when compared to physical attempts on foot.