One month after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s honeymoon period is not yet over. Videos of civil society organizing, celebrations, protests and returns continue to flood out of Damascus and other areas of the country. However questions are increasingly being asked about what will follow. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Ahmad al-Shara’a (otherwise known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) are facing continued criticism about a lack of inclusivity throughout Syria’s interim political process. This is alienating former opposition factions as well as civil society, with some critics pointing to the disparity between al-Jolani’s rhetoric during meetings with international representatives compared with the perceived absence of an inclusive discourse with domestic actors.
Although al-Jolani has presented positive signals about his plans to form a post-Assad Ministry of Defense comprising former opposition factions, there are few signs of practical progress being made. Without a comprehensive, transparent plan for a new Ministry of Defense, many factions are refusing to hand over weapons or lists of members’ names to the interim authorities. HTS-led security forces also conducted dozens of arrest campaigns aimed at confiscating weapons, apprehending alleged war criminals and detaining other former regime personnel, with notable incidents reported in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Latakia and Tartous. A days-long campaign in Homs in early January saw some high-level regime figures taken into custody but also evidence of humiliating practices directed at detainees and residents.
Interim Governance in Damascus
Anger and dissatisfaction is starting to grow within non-HTS military factions in Syria, with commanders and rank-and-file members accusing HTS and al-Jolani of marginalizing all actors not affiliated with the group. Some former opposition groups, including several factions that clashed with HTS earlier in Syria’s conflict, are concerned that al-Jolani is only appointing HTS-affiliated or sympathetic individuals into the interim authority structure. Although al-Jolani has signaled progress in the formation of a post-Assad Ministry of Defense under the control of HTS-led authorities in Damascus, there are few signs of practical progress beyond statements to the media and visiting diplomats. Citing the lack of a transparent plan for the formation of a new Defense Ministry, former opposition factions have not handed over their weapons.
Internally, too, interim authorities are facing issues. There is confusion within Damascus about the National Dialogue Conference, originally announced to be held in early January by al-Jolani. However, beyond this initial announcement there has been little information on how the conference will be organized, who is responsible for overseeing it, the agenda and topics of discussion, let alone who will attend. Although the conference has been postponed on more than one occasion, Interim Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani claimed this week that interim authorities intend to “take [their] time” to ensure the conference is as representative as possible.
Numerically speaking, settlement drives overseen by interim authorities have been successful, with large numbers of former regime and military personnel “settling their status” with new authorities—including generals, major-generals and other officers who until recently held senior and sensitive positions within the former regime’s military and security apparatus. Even Fadi Saqr, the former head of the regime’s National Defense Forces (NDF) militias who is sanctioned for his role in wartime abuses including the 2013 Al-Tadamon massacre, settled his status and returned to Damascus this week. This is a concerning development, one that suggests the settlement process could be susceptible to corruption from well-off former regime insiders—including perpetrators of serious, historic rights abuses.
Security Campaigns & Violations
Security dynamics across the country remain unpredictable, defined by widespread reports of criminality and inconsistent control from authorities in Damascus. Areas across the country have seen upticks in assassination attempts, possibly related to settling of wartime scores or personal disputes. Meanwhile, the past two weeks has seen a wave of arrests and security operations targeting wanted persons, former regime remnants and so-called shabeeha across the country, with notable incidents taking place in Aleppo, Damascus and the outlying countryside, Homs, Latakia and Tartous. Estimates suggest thousands of arrests have taken place in the past month. Security operations in Alawi-majority areas of the Syrian coast, however, resulted in clashes with HTS-led security forces. Although there have been reports of steady steams of former regime and military personnel conducting settlement procedures in Latakia and Tartous, the Military Operations Administration is actually combing rural areas of both provinces to seek out wanted persons refusing settlement as well as any weapons caches left behind by regime military units and/or militias and shabeeha groups once backed by the former regime.
At the beginning of January, HTS-led authorities launched similar combing operations and arrest campaigns in various areas of Homs city to seek out wanted former regime personnel, including soldiers who had failed to conduct settlements and hand over weapons. The first day was a success, with 25 persons detained, including individuals responsible for the 2012 Karam al-Zeitoun massacre. However, in the days that followed, reports emerged of violations commited by HTS-led forces: by 4th January, the number of detainees had reached 110 people, including former soldiers who had already settled their status with interim authorities as well as up to 20 civilians. A video showing security forces humiliating detainees also prompted backlash. Although authorities have since invited civilians to report violations to local authorities, cases of humiliation and arbitrary security practices have drawn some parallels with the practices of the former regime’s security apparatus.
Israeli Incursions
Israeli forces are continuing cross-border incursions into Syrian-controlled territory. Most recently, Israeli bulldozers and armored vehicles entered southern rural Quneitra, where they bulldozed dozens of dunams of forested land and continued preparation of a new position. Videos later showed Israeli tanks entering areas of southern Quneitra close to the provincial border with Daraa. Israeli forces have also taken up a position inside the Quneitra Governorate building. This available evidence indicates that Israel may be expanding and entrenching its occupation over areas of Quneitra province.
Having initially occupied largely rural areas of south-west Syria towards the end of last year, Israeli forces are now increasingly active in urban areas of Quneitra. While continuing raids on former Syrian army bases to confiscate weapons stocks, Israeli officers recently requested that residents of southern Quneitra’s Al-Rafid hand over weapons, warning that their forces will conduct house-to-house searches to look for further weapons in coming days. Members of the press have also been targeted: on 8th January, a French journalist and his Syrian fixer were briefly detained by Israeli forces while reporting from Quneitra.
Rural Aleppo & North-East Syria
Hostilities continue between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with clashes in recent days concentrated around the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge in south-east rural Manbij. Both areas witnessed notable escalations in early January, with clashes involving medium and heavy weaponry reported. A brief calm was broken earlier this week when artillery and Turkish drone strikes targeted SDF positions around Tishreen and Qere Qozak.
